b. He was not here until yesterday.
Punctual and durative until highlight the question of the proper division of labor between lexical meaning, compositional semantics, and pragmatic inferences. Alternative choices for how this division is made bear on a number of issues of general semantic interest, such as the interpretation of negation in the context of temporal interpretation, the interplay of truth conditional and presuppositional content in the readings observed, and polarity sensitivity.
One view attributes the punctual and durative readings of until to lexical ambiguity, another to scopal ambiguity. Adopting the former view here, I
reconsider some of the presumed consequences of the lexical ambiguity approach for the interpretation of negation (sections 2, 3) and revisit the semantics of punctual until (sections [3] [4] [5] [6] . Building on the insights of Karttunen (1974) and Declerck (1995) , I propose a new analysis that links together the truth conditional and presuppositional meaning of punctual until with its status as a polarity item by incorporating scalarity into its meaning. The analysis thus makes good on the intuition that punctual until is scalar by showing how an ordering in the temporal domain translates into an ordering of informational strength. The analysis, moreover, provides a more principled connection between until and related polarity items in other languages, some of which are also negative polarity items (NPIs) and some of which are by contrast positive polarity items (PPIs). Finally, even though my proposal assumes lexical ambiguity between punctual and durative until , it reveals the common aspects of their meaning, needed to explain how one could have developed from the other.
Punctual and Durative Until
With atelic event descriptions, 2 until is acceptable in both positive and negative contexts and the until -phrase is interpreted as a durative adverbial, with the temporal expression indicating the right boundary of an interval.
As a durative adverbial, until requires that a predication hold throughout a given period and is consistent with the predication continuing to hold past that period. Consider, for instance, until with the stative predicates in (3a)
or (4a) and the activity predicates in (3b) or (4b).
(3) a. He was angry until the end of the conference.
b. He drank vodka until the end of the conference.
(4) a. He wasn't available until the end of the conference.
b. He didn't sleep until the end of the conference.
The semantic contribution of the negation is the expected one. The examples in (4) assert that he was unavailable, or sleepless, throughout some period right-bounded by the end of the conference. They are consistent with his remaining unavailable, or sleepless, past the end of the conference.
With telic event descriptions, on the other hand, until is only acceptable in negative contexts, as exemplified by the accomplishment predicate in (5) and the achievement predicate in (6).
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(5) a. *He drank a bottle of vodka until today.
b. He didn't drink a bottle of vodka until today.
(6) a. *The bomb exploded until yesterday.
b. The bomb didn't explode until yesterday.
Moreover, until in these contexts gives rise to the following implications: (i) that the relevant event occurred, an implication that is at first sight surprising, given the presence of negation; (ii) that the event occurred within the time denoted by the temporal expression; (iii) that the time of occurrence could well have been earlier. (6b), for instance, implies that the bomb exploded, that the explosion occurred yesterday, and that the explosion might/could have occurred before yesterday (but it didn't).
Similar facts hold for the Greek NPI para mono lit. 'but for only', as seen in (7), for the German PPI erst, as seen in (8) , as well as for the Dutch PPI pas and English scalar only, also a PPI. 'The bomb didn't explode until yesterday.' Implication (i) raises the question whether negation is to receive its usual interpretation in such cases-a question reinforced by the absence of negation with the otherwise equivalent PPIs. Implication (ii) indicates that the until -phrase (e.g. until yesterday) functions like a frame adverbial (e.g. yesterday) in some way-a way that is also consistent with the unacceptability of (6a), (7a) and (8b). Implication (iii) indicates that the temporal expression of the until -phrase brings with it alternative times for consideration that are somehow used by until and its cross-linguistic equivalents.
These implications also distinguish between durative and punctual until .
For instance, (9a) does not necessarily imply that he became angry at the very end of the ordeal, an implication that is associated with (9b).
(9) a. He wasn't angry until the very end of the ordeal. b. He didn't become angry until the very end of the ordeal.
A further difference is that (9a) is ambiguous while (9b) is not. On one reading-let's call it the 'throughout-not' reading-(9a) implies that he remained calm throughout the ordeal. The other reading-let's call it the 'not-throughout' reading-negates that he remained angry throughout the ordeal, and is consistent with a situation in which he was first angry and then calmed down part way through the ordeal. (9b), by contrast, has only one reading, implying that he was calm through the ordeal and that he became angry only at the very end.
Several approaches to the role of negation and the lexical meaning of until have been pursued in the literature. Klima 1964 , Heinämäki 1974 , and Mittwoch 1977 , among others, claim that the ambiguity is scopal, not lexical.
Until -phrases are uniformly interpreted as durative adverbials. Negation is a predicate modifier, turning any predicate it applies to into one that satisfies the selectional restriction of the until -phrase, informally characterized as requiring 'durative' predicates. 5 This explains the contrasts in (5) and (6), where the until -phrase's selectional restriction is satisfied by the result of applying negation to a telic predicate but not by a telic predicate itself.
Negation and until -phrases are assumed to be of the same type and to scope freely with respect to each other, as required to account for the ambiguity of (9a). A scoping in which the selectional restriction of the until -phrase is not satisfied produces no interpretation; hence, (9b) is unambiguous. Finally, implications (i) and (ii) discussed above are argued to not be unique with until -phrases construed with telic predicates. They are attributed to a conversational implicature that the asserted predication ceases to hold at the time denoted by the temporal expression of the until -phrase (though the mechanism by which such a conversational implicature arises is not pinned down).
This approach can be concretized as follows. We take sentence radicals to denote properties of eventualities and until -phrases and negation to be aspectual operators. Aspectual operators are predicate modifiers that can combine directly with a sentence radical and can scope freely with each other. Tense has outermost scope and maps properties to propositions. We then get the logical forms in (10) and in (11) for (9).
(10) negation scoping under until-phrase a. Past ((Until (EoO)(Not (he-be-angry)))) b. Past ((Until (EoO)(Not (he-become-angry)))) (11) negation scoping over until-phrase
The 'throughout-not' reading of (9a) corresponds to the scoping in (10a) and the 'not-throughout' reading to that in (11a). The punctual reading exhibited by (9b) is, in this analysis, a 'throughout-not' reading, corresponding to the scoping in (10b). (11b) has no semantic value because the telic predicate the until -phrase directly combines with does not conform to its selectional restriction.
Another kind of approach assumes that until is lexically ambiguous between a durative until (henceforth, until D ) and a punctual until , (henceforth, until P ), each with its own selectional restrictions, intuitively characterized as durativity and punctuality. This approach is coupled with varying assumptions regarding the status of negation.
Horn (1970, 1972) and Karttunen (1974) claim that negation is an operator scoping over the until P -phrase and that until P is an NPI. The logical form for (9b) is (11b) rather than (10b): only in the scopal configuration of (11b) is until P licensed. Karttunen, moreover, argues that negation always scopes over both until D and until P -phrases, hence the scoping options in (10) are excluded. He attributes the ambiguity of (9a) to the lexical ambiguity of until and an additional ambiguity of predicates like be angry between a stative and an inchoative reading. On its stative reading the predicate satisfies the selectional restriction of until D , on its inchoative reading that of until P . The 'not-throughout' reading then corresponds to the logical form in (12a) and the 'throughout-not' reading to the logical form in (12b).
Declerck (1995), in another variant of the lexical ambiguity approach, claims that not . . . until is semantically a single lexical item, interpreted as a temporal exclusive focus particle, with not indicating the exclusive aspect of the meaning.
The decisive arguments in favor of lexical ambiguity, familiar from Karttunen (1974) and Declerck (1995) , are twofold. The first argument is that the actualization implication associated with until P (implication (i) discussed above) cannot be cancelled the way conversational implicatures are. The second argument is that other languages make a lexical distinction between until P and until D , using a polarity sensitive item for until P and a non-polarity sensitive item for until D . 6 The purely scopal analysis of until trades uniformity in the meaning of English until with non-uniformity between NPIs and PPIs amongst the cross-linguistic equivalents of until P :
PPIs, such as German erst-phrases, clearly do not combine with a negative predicate and cannot be interpreted like durative adverbials. My proposal will reconcile the treatment of until P as an NPI with the treatment of negation as an aspectual operator allowed to scope narrowly.
(11b) will be the logical form for until P , as in the NPI analysis, and (10a) and (11a) the logical forms for until D , as in the scope analysis. 
Negation and Scope
The proposal is couched in an event-based framework, with a domain E of eventualities, a domain T of non-null temporal intervals (with points as a special case) and a domain W of worlds. The temporal trace τ is a partial
function from E × W to T giving the time span of an eventuality that occurs in a given world. T is partially ordered by the relation of temporal precedence ≺ and by the subinterval relation ⊆ T ; E by the subevent relation ⊆ E . The operations ⊕ T on T and ⊕ E on E give the sum of two intervals and of two eventualities, respectively (intuitively, the minimal interval/eventuality with these two as subintervals/subevents). An operation and t 2 as an initial/final subinterval (intuitively, the interval that stretches from the beginning of t 1 to the end of t 2 ). (t 1 , t 2 ) is an interval all of whose initial/final subintervals do not overlap t 1 /t 2 and whose sum with t 1 /t 2 yields a convex interval. Finally, for any world w and time t, E w,t is that subset of E that consists of all eventualities e occurring in w and whose temporal trace in w is a subinterval of t.
Let Ep be the collection of properties of eventualities, Tp be the collection of temporal properties, Prop the collection of propositions. Sentence radicals denote in Ep. Untensed sentences modified by frame adverbials or aspectual operators denote in Tp. Tensed sentences denote in Prop.
Tense and aspectual operators operate on properties of eventualities or on temporal properties and instantiate them relative to a world and a time as defined in (15) . Instantiation of properties of eventualities involves the familiar existential quantification over the event variable. b. Pres(May(Not (Perf (At(Yesterday)(he-arrive))))) Its interpretation can be specified as in (19) . Negation applied to a property of eventualities or of times yields, for any world, the set of intervals in which that property is not instantiated.
(19) Not : λP λwλt. ¬Inst(P, w, t)
A popular idea often associated with treating negation as an aspectual operator is that negation yields predicates of states and that durative predicates, selected by until D , are to be identified with stative predicates (see de Swart (1996) for detailed discussion). Although it is an attractive idea at first sight, it turns out that the sortal distinction between events and states does no real work. 11 Rather, what is crucial is the reference to the maximal eventuality relative to an interval (Krifka 1989 ) and what properties of eventualities are instantiated in that interval.
To see this, let us adapt de Swart's (1996) proposal as in (20) , supposing that E is sorted into a set of states E S and a set of events E E and that is a generalization of the binary sum operation ⊕ to a set of elements in the relevant domain.
However, for eventive P , (20) above and (21) below are equivalent both truth conditionally and in terms of the (second-order) properties of the denotation of the resulting negative predicate.
(21) Not : λP λwλtλe.e = E E (λe .τ (e , w) ⊆ E E t) ∧ ¬Inst(P, w, τ (e, w)))
For any given P, w, t, the resulting predicate of states under (20) holds of the maximal state relative to t iff the resulting predicate of events under (21) holds of the maximal event relative to t iff P is not instantiated relative to (20) and τ (e, w) = t in (21)). Moreover, on both analyses a negative predicate's denotation is null or singular for any given world and time; hence, (20) and (21) cannot differ in the aspectual effect of negation.
We can conclude that the sortal distinction plays no role in the aspectual effect of negation and, consequently, that durativity is not to be reconstructed in terms of the sort of eventuality a predicate ranges over.
Thus, one potential motivation for analyzing negation as a mapping to Ep rather than to Tp is removed. The treatment of negation in (19) is simpler for our purposes and more general.
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Until D is a backward-expanding interval operator: when it operates on a temporal expression denoting time t, it yields a predicate modifier making reference to an interval with t as a final proper subinterval (in the absence of any contextual restrictions (−∞, t)). In what follows, I will assume that expanded intervals are contextually restricted via intersection with a contextually supplied bounded interval. An until D -phrase is a mapping from
Ep ∪ Tp to Tp, requiring that P be instantiated throughout the contextually restricted expanded interval. 14 The content of until D yesterday relative to a fixed context is specified in (22), taking I to be a contextually determined interval with I B as its starting point.
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(22) Until D (Yesterday):
The selectional restriction of until D can now be seen as a way to ensure that the falsity of the universal statement is a matter of contingent fact; this would be the case only if P has certain reference properties (I use the term 'reference properties', in the sense of Krifka (1992) , for second-order properties of predicate denotations). The most straightforward way to connect until D 's selectional restriction with its content is by reconstructing durativity as divisiveness; but even if divisiveness turns out to be an inadequate reconstruction, the general point remains that the selectional restriction has to do with the reference properties of P , rather than the sort of individual (e.g., states) that P is a property of. An informal characterization of divisiveness for one-place predicates is given in (23).
(23) A unary predicate P is divisive iff its denotation in any model is closed under the subpart relation (i.e., any subpart of a P -entity is also a P -entity).
Stative and activity predicates are divisive, 16 accomplishments and achievements are not. 17 Negation as in (19) applied to any property of eventualities yields a divisive predicate given the downward persistence of non-instantiation. But what is the meaning of until P ? In the following section I pull together some of the necessary ingredients by looking at the meaning assigned to it by the two main analyses that recognize it as distinct from Until P is a backward-expanding interval operator, requiring that P be instantiated within the expanded interval.
(28) a. Presupposition:
With the logical form of (25) I adopt Karttunen's proposal for the truth conditional content of until P as reconstructed here, aiming for a more uniform meaning for NPIs and PPIs, seeking a better motivation for the disjunctive specification of the presuppositional content, and relating the reference to times other than that denoted by the temporal expression to the appearance of focus on the temporal expression.
Declerck (1995), observing that the temporal expression is in focus,
proposes that not . . . until P is an exclusive focus particle. Following König (1991), he assumes that exclusive focus particles "trigger a presupposition that corresponds to the relevant sentence in the scope of the particle" (p.
55). Unlike the scope analysis or the NPI analysis, not . . . until P is not the composition of two independent elements but one element semantically, N ot-Until . As an exclusive focus particle, its truth conditional content makes reference to the alternatives generated by the expression in focus; its presupposition makes reference to the ordinary semantic value of the expression in its scope, giving rise to the inference that the eventuality description is instantiated within the time denoted by the temporal expression. On this analysis, (25) presupposes that he left yesterday and asserts that he didn't leave at any of the alternative times, restricted to times preceding yesterday.
In order to formalize Declerck's proposal, let us assume that N ot-Until , combining with a temporal expression in focus, both restricts and uses up the focus generated alternatives. Supposing that the alternatives are contextually restricted to a disjoint cover of a contextually determined interval I, 22 we can take N ot-Until to further restrict them to those preceding the time denoted by the temporal expression and to assert that the relevant property is not instantiated at any of the restricted alternatives. We can then specify the meaning of N ot-Until (Yesterday) as in (33). 23 Phrases with the corresponding PPIs, like erst, are assigned the same meaning.
(33) a. Presupposition: λP λwλt.Inst(P, w, yest ∩ t)
b. Assertion:
where Declerck describes not . . . until as a scalar particle but the proposed meaning as an exclusive temporal operator, functioning temporally like the operator At in frame adverbials, does not cash out this intuition. Even though the domain of focus generated alternatives is ordered (by the relation of temporal precedence), there is no corresponding ordering of semantic specificity or informational strength. In the following section I show how this intuition can be cashed out.
Scalar Assertions
The analysis posits that until P is a focus sensitive, polarity sensitive, backward-expanding interval operator. Though focus sensitive, it does not use up the focus generated alternatives: rather it operates on them and projects them upwards. Though polarity sensitive, it does not introduce alternatives of its own but operates on the alternatives introduced by the expression in focus it combines with. As a backward-expanding interval operator, it operates both on the ordinary semantic value of the expression it combines with and on the alternatives, resulting in propositions ordered by the entailment relation. This makes it a scalar operator. is the longest interval in which there is no eventuality of type P occurring, hence the longest interval contained in I neg . That it is an interval in which no eventuality of type P occurs is due to until P 's truth conditional content and the interpretation of negation. That it is the longest such interval amongst the alternatives is a quantity implicature, due to the fact that until P gives rise to scalar assertions, as explained below.
We can specify the content of Until P (Yesterday) as in (36). The first member of the pair is the ordinary semantic value of the phrase, the same as in (28b). The second member is the set of contextually restricted alternatives that constitute a subset of its focus semantic value.
(36) λP λwλt.Inst(P, w, [I B , yest ∩ t)),
The alternatives in (36) are not discharged at the level of the until -phrase.
They project upwards, ultimately giving rise to alternative propositions.
The proposition expressed by (25), then, is as in (37), and the set of alternative propositions, including the proposition expressed, is as in (38).
(37) λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,[I B ,yest) )he-leave(w)(e) (38) {λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,[I B ,t alt ) )he-leave(w)(e) | t alt ∈ Alt (Yesterday)} (25), thus, entails that he didn't leave at any time preceding yest and contextually entails that he left within yest or later. Since the presupposition of (25) is weaker on this analysis than on Karttunen's and the truth conditional content the same, the contextual entailment is correspondingly weaker. The stronger implication that he left within yest is, I claim, the result of defeasible pragmatic reasoning associated with scalar assertions.
The ordering of temporal precedence in the set of alternative times induces an ordering in the set of alternative propositions in (38) via the expanded intervals introduced by until P . For any t 1 , t 2 ∈ Alt (Yesterday) such
, and, consequently, the proposition λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,[I B ,t 2 ) )he-leave(w)(e) asymmetrically entails the proposition λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,[I B ,t 1 ) )he-leave(w)(e) given the downward persistence of non-instantiation. The crucial role of expanded intervals in the scalarity of until P is now apparent: there is no relation of entailment between the propositions λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,t 1 )he-leave(w)(e) and λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,t 2 )he-leave(w)(e), for any t 1 , t 2 ∈ Alt(Yesterday).
An assertion of (25), therefore, constitutes a scalar assertion: the proposition actually asserted is informationally (at least) as strong as the alternative propositions corresponding to alternative times earlier than yest and (at least) as weak as the alternative propositions corresponding to alternative times later than yest. Relative to contexts c satisfying until P 's presuppositions, the proposition actually asserted is, in fact, stronger than the alternative propositions corresponding to times earlier than yest and weaker than the alternative propositions corresponding to times later than yest. For any t 1 , t 2 ∈ Alt(Yesterday) such that t 1 ≺ t 2 , the context resulting from the update with the proposition corresponding to t 2 is more informative than the one resulting from the update with the proposition corresponding to Suppose now that the pragmatics of scalar assertions requires that for any of the non-asserted alternative propositions that are informationally stronger than the actually asserted proposition the speaker has grounds for not asserting it. The best possible grounds for not asserting it would be if the speaker knows (or presumes) that the proposition is false. Then by using an element that gives rise to a scalar assertion, without any further qualification, a speaker indicates that any stronger proposition is in fact (or can be presumed to be) false. In the case of (25), the propositions corresponding to alternative times later than yest must not be viable alternatives, for otherwise they would entail the asserted proposition.
Therefore, his leaving is implied to have occurred within yest.
However, this is a defeasible inference. The speaker can suspend the presumption of falsity of informationally stronger alternative propositions by some explicit means. One such case, noted by Mittwoch (1977) , is (39), which implies that he may have woken up later than nine.
(39) He didn't wake up until at least nine.
Moreover, given that the informationally stronger alternative propositions correspond to times later than yest, any qualification suspending this presumption of falsity would have to implicitly or explicitly make reference to times later than yest, hence the often noted contrast in (40), originally discussed by Horn (1972) . (42) Erst (Yesterday):
The basic idea about the meaning of erst gestern in a positive context is that of all the forward-expanded alternative intervals, [yest, I E ] is the shortest interval in which an eventuality of type P occurs, hence the shortest interval containing I pos . As with until P , that it is an interval in which an eventuality of type P occurs is its plain truth conditional content; that it is the shortest such interval amongst the alternatives is a scalar implicature. Expanded intervals are crucial in the scalarity of erst. For any given the upward persistence of instantiation. It follows that an assertion of (41) is scalar and that relative to contexts satisfying erst's presuppositions the proposition actually asserted is, in fact, stronger than the alternative propositions corresponding to times earlier than yest and weaker than the alternative propositions corresponding to times later than yest. The pragmatics of scalar assertions gives rise to the inference that the propositions corresponding to alternative times following yest are not be viable alternatives, for otherwise they would entail the asserted proposition.
Can we now use the scalarity of until P and erst to explain their polarity sensitivity? Though scalar, these items do not correspond to minimal or maximal elements of a scale and, as a result, the alternative propositions are not uniform in terms of their relation of informational strength with the actually asserted proposition. Moreover, they are not exhaustive with respect to the alternatives on either side or taken together: for instance, Krifka's (1995) explanation for the polarity sensitivity of weak PIs, such as any, cannot be applied to them.
Krifka folds scalar implicatures into the contextual update with scalar assertions, as seen in (44). The idea is that scalar assertions result in a more informative context than plain assertions: in addition to asserting the proposition expressed, they negate any informationally stronger alternative propositions.
Weak PIs in a non-licensing environment give rise to a proposition that is informationally weaker than all the alternatives. Since they are exhaustive with respect to the alternatives, the assertive effect of such items is to lead to a contradictory context (the empty set).
In the scope of negation, until yesterday, in effect, expresses that the presupposed negative phase I neg extends at least up to yest In addition to operating on the full set of alternatives associated with a temporal expression in focus, until P and erst select a designated subset.
That subset consists of those alternatives preceding the time denoted by the temporal expression. In general, the presence of designated alternatives amongst the full set of alternatives signals a special kind of scalar assertion, corresponding to the illocutionary operator CapAssert, whose effect is to settle a given issue with respect to the designated alternatives. In other words, the context resulting from such an assertion should either entail, or be incompatible with, any proposition based on a designated alternative.
CapAssert is associated with the felicity condition in (45), where Alt (p) is the full set of alternatives and Alt D (p) the designated subset.
(45) CapAssert is defined for p, Alt D (p), Alt(p) , c only if
In order for the felicity condition in (45) to be satisfied, the actually asserted proposition must be strong enough that the result of updating a context with it is sufficiently informative to determine the truth or falsity of the designated alternative propositions. For assertions involving until P and erst, the designated alternative propositions are those corresponding to times earlier than the time denoted by the temporal expression.
As discussed in section 5, with until P in the scope of negation and with erst in a positive environment, the proposition expressed entails the designated alternative propositions. With the polarity reversed, on the other hand, the proposition expressed is not strong enough to settle the truth or falsity of the designated alternatives. For instance, the positive counterpart of (25) would express the proposition in (46) and the negative counterpart of (41) the one in (47).
(46) λw.(∃e ∈ E w,[I B ,yest) )he-leave(w)(e) (47) λw.¬(∃e ∈ E w,[yest,I E ] )he-leave(w)(e)
A context compatible with the departure occurring at any one of the alternative times, once updated with (46) or with (47), will remain compatible with the departure occurring at any one of the alternative times preceding yest. But then it will neither entail, nor be incompatible with, any of the designated alternative propositions.
Conclusion
Until P and erst are felicitously uttered in contexts determining that a phase transition within a contextually given interval I occurs at one time among a set of alternatives but agnostic as to which one. Until P is used to (partially) settle the issue of what that time is by determining how far to the right the presupposed maximal negative phase I neg extends; erst by determining how far to the left the presupposed minimal positive phase I pos extends. Until P asserts that I neg extends up to at least the time asserted and scalarly implicates that it does not extend up to any later time. Erst asserts that I pos extends up to at most the time asserted and scalarly implicates that it does in fact extend that far.
5. Hitzeman (1991) and Tovena (1995) also pursue an approach that gives a uniform lexical meaning to until but take negation to combine directly with until and to be interpreted as a complementation operator on intervals.
6. Giannakidou (2002) is a recent reminder of this argument based on Greek.
7. Similarly for bis, the German equivalent of until D , except that there is no contrast like that between (14d) and (14e). Die Bombe ist bis gestern nicht explodiert 'The bomb didn't explode until yesterday' and Die Bombe ist/war bis jetzt/gestern nicht explodiert 'The bomb has/had not exploded until now/yesterday' are both acceptable. Arguably, this may be due to the use of the perfect in both cases, though in the first case the perfect is interpreted like past tense.
8. This position is also reflected in de Swart's formalization of the scope analysis and of Karttunen's proposal for until P in an event-based framework.
She treats negation as a modifier on predicates of eventualities in her reconstruction of the scope analysis and as a propositional operator in her reconstruction of Karttunen's proposal. runs into a more immediate problem: negation simply yields the set of all maximal states (relative to some time). The negative condition is satisfied trivially given that the domain of events is assumed to be disjoint from the domain of states.
13. It is also worth noting in this connection that the analysis of negation in (20) or (21) does not give us an individuation of 'negative eventualities' that is as fine-grained as the intuitive characterization of the approach suggests.
For any given world w and time t, there is exactly one state (eventuality) for all the properties of eventualities not instantiated relative to w, t. For example, if I didn't eat during a given stretch of time and you didn't sleep during that time, then the state of my not eating is exactly the same as the state of your not sleeping.
14. Although a universal semantics is common for durative adverbials, it is problematic for eventive P if the domain of quantification is not relativized in some way. The reason is that the structure of events may well be taken to be coarser than the structure of times. For purposes of this paper, I simply assume that universal quantification is over times at the same level of granularity as that of atomic eventualities. 16. For activity predicates, we have to relativize the closure condition to a certain level of granularity.
17. I assume that achievements are properties of non-point eventualities, for otherwise they would be divisive trivially. If it turns out that they ought to be analyzed as properties of point eventualities, we would need to appeal to a notion of strict divisiveness such as the following: a unary predicate P is strictly divisive iff P is divisive and in any model, either there are no P -entities or some P -entity has a proper subpart.
18. Assuming that mehri -phrases select for predicates over states, Giannakidou (2002) takes this fact to show that negation is to yield predicates of events (as in (21)) and not predicates of states (as in (18)), on the grounds that if it were to yield predicates of states sentences like (14d)
would be grammatical. But we have seen that no empirical evidence of this sort can discriminate between these two analyses.
19. At least for English. Greek para mono selects against stative predicates.
For instance, Dhen itan thimomenos para mono htes 'He was not angry except for yesterday' has no scalar reading: it can only mean that he was angry yesterday and at no other time, earlier or later. Para mono with activity predicates, on the other hand, can have a scalar reading, equivalent to that of until P . For instance, Dhen kimithike para mono stis pende 'He only slept at five' has a reading implying that he fell asleep no earlier than five.
20. Negation, as a hole for presuppositions, is the identity mapping when operating on presuppositional content. yest ∩ (−∞, now) = yest.
21. The disjunction has to be exclusive in order for 'A Erst T' to contextually entail NOT (A BEFORE T).
22. This is in accord with Rooth's (1992) theory of focus interpretation, whereby the focus semantic value of an expression in the scope of a focus sensitive operator constrains the set of alternatives the operator operates on rather than fixing it uniquely.
23. Tense or other aspectual operators do not restrict t alt in any way; the condition t = t is meant to avoid vacuous λ-abstraction, while keeping the type of the ordinary semantic value and of the elements of the focus semantic value the same.
24. Mittwoch (2001) uses cases like (34) to argue that on Declerck's analysis the actualization implication is more appropriately seen as an entailment, rather than a presuppositional implication.
25. The identity of I neg and I pos , therefore, varies across the worlds of a given context.
26. We may add that the earlier alternatives are presumed to be more likely than the later alternatives in order to capture a 'later than expected' implication associated with until P . This aspect of the presupposition will not
be crucial in what follows.
27. Thanks to David Beaver for suggesting this sort of evidence.
28. On Karttunen's and Declerck's analyses, such qualifications would have to be due to presupposition weakening, rather than cancellation of a scalar implicature.
29. I ∩ [yest ∩ t, +∞) = [yest ∩ t, I E ] if intersection is defined and yest ≺ I E .
30. It would be interesting to investigate if there are languages with scalar but non-polarity sensitive equivalents of until P or erst. The until P -equivalent would appear to mean 'at' in negative contexts and 'just before' in positive contexts; the erst-equivalent would appear to mean 'at' in positive contexts and 'just before' in negative contexts.
